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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GUARANTY NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
PlaintiffRespondent,

No. 18964

VS.

OCCIDENTAL FIRE AND
CASUALTY COMPANY,
DefendantAppellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for declaratory judgment based
on an alleged overpayment of a settlement for personal
injuries arising out of an automobile-truck accident.
The original personal injury lawsuit was settled by the
parties to this action, and then the plaintiff filed
a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of
the respective rights of the two insurance carriers.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Both the plaintiff and the defendant filed Motions
for Summary Judgment based on stipulated facts.

The Third

Judicial District Court granted plaintiff's Motion and

denied defendant's Motion.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant, Occidental Fire and Casualty Company,
seeks a reversal of the lower court judgment and a
determination that the plaintiff is the primary insurance
carrier.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 17, 1978, DeLoy Bisel was driving his 1977
International tractor and collided with an automobile
being driven by Brenda M. Howcroft.

As a result of the

collision, Brenda Howcroft, Lisa Howcroft and Karen
Howcroft all sustained serious personal injuries.

The

Howcrofts initiated a lawsuit in the Third Judicial
District Court and sought damages for these personal
injuries in excess of $800,000.
At the time of the collision, Mr. Bisel was
operating his truck under a Hauling Contract for Norwood
Transportation, Inc.

(R. 91-92.)

Also, at the time of

the accident, Bisel had a policy of insurance covering
the truck with Occidental Fire and Casualty Company,
the appellant herein (hereinafter designated "Occidental.")
(R.

57-58.)
At the same time, Norwood Transportation, Inc., had

policy of insurance with Guaranty

National Insurance

Company, the plaintiff-respondent herein (hereinafter
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c

i

g ria ted

"Guaranty.

u

(R. 58.)

The personal injury lawsuit filed by the Howcrofts
•

ic,

011e

finally terminated by settlement for the sum of $150, 000.
Hundred Thousand Dollars of that amount was paid by Guaranty,

and $50,000 was paid by Occidental.

Guaranty paid its

policy limits under protest, taking the position that it
was the excess carrier to Occidental.

Occidental, of

course, took the position that Guaranty
that Occidental's policy was excess.

(R.

was primary and
59.)

Hauling Contract
The agreement which was in effect at the time of the
accident between Bisel and Norwood Transportation, Inc.,
is set forth in its entirety at pages 91-92 of the record.
There are two paragraphs in the contract which are of some
import in this case:
12. Contractor
harmless the company
for damages of every
the operation of the
beyond the terms and
(Emphasis added.)

hereby indemnifies and saves
from any loss or liability
description arising out of
equipment herein described
conditions of this contract.

13.
Company agrees to assume full responsibility for liability to the public arising out
of the operation of the equipment leased hereby,
during the period the equipment is operated in
accordance with the terms and conditions of
this contract.
Under paragraph 6 of the Stipulation of Facts, there
is no question but that DeLoy Bisel was operating his tractor
under the terms of the Hauling Contract at the time of the
accident.

(R.

58.)
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The Occidental Policy
The Occidental policy which was in effect at the

t

1,

of the accident issued to DeLoy Bisel had a "Long Haul
Truckman" endorsement.

The endorsement provided, amonq

other things:
With respect to any automobile of the
commercial type while leased or loaned to
any person or organization, other than
the named insured, engaged in the business
of transporting property by automobile for
others, or any other hired private passenger
automobile insured on the "cost of hire"
basis, or any non-owned automobile, this
insurance shall be excess insurance over
any other valid and collectible insurance.
(R. 67.)

The Guarantv Polirv
The Guaranty

policy, which covered Norwood Transpor-

tation, Inc., at the time of the accident certified that
Public Service Commission filings had been made in the States
of Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, Oregon, and Montana, and that
a filing was made with the Interstate Commerce Commission.
(R. 76.)

In addition, the Guarantee policy had a "Truckman"
endorsement which provided, in part:
With respect to (1) any automobile
of the commercial type while leased or
loaned to any person or organization,
other than the named insured engaged
in the business of transporting property
by automobile for others, or (2) any
hired private passenger automobile,
or (3) any non-owned automobile, the
insurance under this endorsement
shall be excess insurance over any other
valid and collectible insurance, whether
-4-

primary, excess or contingent, available
to the insured. Otherwise, the insurance
under this endorsement is primary coverage.
(R. 83.)

The policy issued by Guaranty

to Norwood Transportation

provided for payment of premiums based on the mileage of
the entire fleet of Norwood Transportation.

There was not a

schedule of specific trucks or vehicles set forth in the
Guaranty policy.

(R.

88.)

ARGUMENT
THE GUARANTY POLICY IS PRIMhRY AND THE
OCCIDENTAL POLICY IS EXCESS. THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN HOLDING TO THE CONTRARY.
We are thus faced with two policies which cover the
accident and provide indemnity for the tort liability of
Mr. Bisel and Norwood Transportation, Inc.

Both policies

contain excess clauses applicable in the event there is
other valid, collectible insurance.

The Occidental policy

contains a specific excess provision in the Long Haul
Truckman endorsement, applicable where the insured vehicle
is used under lease to a motor carrier.

The Guaranty

policy in this case is issued and certified pursuant to
Federal regulations and state regulations which require
the licensed common carrier to provide proof of financial
responsibility by insurance or otherwise and to certify
the existence of such insurance by filing a certificate
with the ICC.
The appellant has found no Utah cases precisely in
point.

There are two distinct lines of authority.
-5-

Some of

the cases disregard the fact that filings had been made
with the ICC and/or Public Service CoffiPlission certifyinq
insurance and decide that the poliry written on the
specific vehicle is primary.
Insurance Company v.

See,

Carolina Casualt:;

Insurance Company of North America,

595 F.2d 128 (Third Cir. 1979); Carolina Casualty Insurance
Company v. Transport Indemnity Company, 488 F.2d 790
(10th Cir. 1973).
The appellant submits, however, that the better
reasoned line of authority reaches the opposite result.
In a decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Arizona
on September 30, 1982, which had not been published
when this case was argued to lower court on August 12,
1982, the issues are discussed in detail.

Transport

Indemnity Co. v. Carolina Casualty Co., 652 P.2d 134 (Ariz.
1982).

In that case, the Arizona Supreme Court discussed

all of the issues involved, including the specific language
of the two policies.

It specifically rejected the holding

in the Tenth Circuit opinion of Carolina Casualty v. Transoor
Indemnity, supra, because in that case both insurance carrier'
had filed ICC certification.

The Court then went on to point

out that although both policies had specific excess clauses,
the policy covering the lessee

(in this case

Guaranty) was

rendered unenforceable by virtue of the provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act and the regulations that were enacte
thereunder.

Transport Indemnity Co. v. Carolina Casualty
-6-

Insurance, 652 P.2d at 139.

See also, Argonaut Insurance

Co. v. National Indemnity Co., 435 F.2d 718 (10th Cir.
1971); Hagans v. Glens Falls Insurance Co., 465 F.2d 1249
(10th Cir. 1972).
Anticipating that Guaranty will argue that the
ICC endorsement and the language in the Hauling Contract
are only effective with regard to disputes between the
shipper and members of the general public who are injured,
and that insurers are free between themselves to contract
for allocation of the risk, Occidental still submits that,
at most, its policy extends only excess coverage for
any accident which occurs while the described vehicle is
leased to a common carrier.

This is the very reason, in

fact, for the excess provision in the Long Haul Truckman's
endorsement.

See Transport Indemnity Co. v. Home Indemnity

535 F.2d 232

(3rd Cir. 1976).

Further, appellant

contends that the Court cannot disregard the provisions
of Federal law and that the ICC filing mandates that the
Guarantee policy be primary.

Truck Insurance Exchange v.

Transport Indemnity Co., 180 Mont. 419, at 432, 591 P.2d
188, at 195

(1979).

In the final part of its analysis, the Arizona Supreme
Court held that even if the ICC endorsement had not been
present in the policy provided to the lessee, it would be
compelled to decide the issue exactly the same based on
its interpretation of the Interstate Conunerce Act.
-7-

It

said:
The intent of Congress was not just to
provide assurance that the claims of shippers
and inJured members of the public would
ultimately be paid.
The intent was to
permit the ICC to abolish and regulate a
wide range of practices which had come into
existence in the trucking industry "by
imposing 'responsibility-and-control' regulations governing the regulation of non-owned
vehicles."
Thus, we disagree with the concept that
all loss allocations between private parties
are permissible so long as they do not
directly prevent compensation to the public.
In some cases private regulations respecting
loss allegation do not significantly intrude
in the Federal regulatory scheme and are
permissible . . . . However, in all cases the
Federal policy must be considered paramount
and affects the interpretation and construction
to be given the contractual agreements. We
believe here that Federal policy does affect
the determination of primary and excess status
between carriers regardless of the presence
or absence of the ICC clause physically
attached to the policy.
First, given the fact that the Congressional
Act imposes direct liability on the lessee and
given further that the lessee's insurance policy
is proof of the lessee's financial responsibility
for that very liability, we believe that the
purposes which Congress and the ICC intended to
accomplish in regulating the trip lease problem
are better served if the lessee's insurance is
considered "responsible for primary coverage,
both as a matter of law and of public policy."
Transport Indemnity Co. v. Carolina Casualty
Insurance, 652 P.2d at 143-44.
The respondent, Guaranty, respectfully suggests
that requiring primary coverage from the lessee's carrier
has the effect of establishing a uniform rule fixing
-8-

rrimary financial responsibility for defense and payment
of claims in all cases involving trip leases.

This policy

would have the effect of aiding in the disposition of claims
without delays resulting from litigation between the
insurers in order to determine which of them is to provide
primary coverage and which is excess coverage.
CONCLUSION
The appellant recognizes that there are two distinct
lines of authority deciding the issues presented in this
case.

Although there are no Utah cases precisely in point,

the most recent, and the best reasoned of the cases deciding
these issues holds that the insurance carrier providing
coverage to the lessee is primary and that the insurance
carrier providing coverage to the lessor is excess.

For

these reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the lower
court's decision should be reversed, and that judgment
should be entered in favor of the appellant and against
the respondent, finding that the respondent is the primary
insurance carrier and appellant is excess.
Submitted this

day of April, 1983.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

David W. Slagle
Attorneys for Appellant

-9-
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